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ABSTRACT 
The Human Development Report 2007/2008 about climate change and development made bold 
arguments concerning human rights and justice for poor and disadvantaged populations. However, its 
policy proposals were less bold, looking very similar to those of the World Bank's World Development 
Report 2010. This article investigates in which direction the thinking on environment and sustainability 
by UNDP’s Human Development Report Office has evolved since 2007/8. A detailed frame- and lexical 
analysis of the HDR 2011 on Sustainability and Equity shows a markedly technocratic direction, 
largely apolitical and insensitive to human rights issues and justice, giving a diluted successor to the 
HDR 2007/2008, now close in perspective to the World Bank. This direction as well as the little 
attention to the socio-economic and political barriers to sustainability and to climate change impacts 
we find in the HDR 2011, has implications for the poorest sectors of South African society.  
 
 Keywords: climate change, development, environment, human rights, problem and policy 
frames, South Africa, United Nations Development Programme  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
A global Human Development Report (HDR) prepared for the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) appears annually. This series competes with the World Development 
Report (WDR) series prepared by the World Bank, for the position of the most widely read 
and influential, agenda-defining, annual report series on international development. The HDR 
20001 took major steps towards integrating the much longer established framework of human 
rights with the HDRs’ ‘human development’ conceptual framework, which has been associat-
ed especially with Amartya Sen’s ‘capability approach’.2 The HDR 2007/2008 presented the 
problems that anthropogenic climate change poses for development in terms of human rights 
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violations, with reference to power relations at the global level.3 Runaway climate change 
‘would represent a systematic violation of the human rights of the world’s poor and future 
generations’ by current rich polluters.4  The HDR 2007/2008 on climate change stood in 
marked contrast to the equally imposing WDR 2010 on climate change, which adopted a sig-
nificantly different problem framing and situation diagnosis.5 The WDR argued that no reduc-
tion in economic growth is necessary, and, in line with established World Bank practice,6 
avoided the language of human rights. Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St. Clair have 
argued that the World Bank’s treatment of equity has been primarily instrumental, devoid of 
an intrinsic value for equity and of one of the central foundations of human rights: the intrinsic 
equal value of all human beings.7  
 Recent articles have compared these two reports in detail, for they are the major 
statements on climate change from the two leading international development organisations.8 
In our own analysis,9 we compared their Overviews using a frame and content-analysis meth-
odology that focused attention on key terms and framing choices. We contextualised this 
analysis from studies of the institutions’ processes of knowledge production, their socio-
political environment, and results from earlier work investigating the role of ideas in the multi-
lateral sector. We found something surprising. While the HDR 2007/2008 took a very different 
stance in comparison to the WDR 2010 in its evaluative language, the policy solutions pre-
sented by the two organisations were largely similar. The HDR did not follow through its hu-
man rights-related evaluation into a human rights-based policy perspective. Questions arose 
regarding the reasons for the inconsistency in the HDR 2007/2008, and how the standpoint of 
the UNDP – in particular that of the semi-autonomous HDR Office (HDRO) – would evolve.10  
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 The HDR 2011 on sustainability and equity provides a relevant opportunity to address 
these questions. How embedded is a human rights perspective in UN work on human 
development, and especially in relation to the looming human rights challenge of 
anthropogenic climate change? The HDR 2011 appeared in the run-up to the UN conference 
on Sustainable Development, the Rio+20 conference of 2012, and was titled ‘Sustainability 
and Equity: A Better Future for All’.11 As such it constitutes an attempted major statement, 
intended to structure the new agenda for sustainability to be adopted by ‘the international 
community’. Responses to climate change challenges must be considered in the context of 
existing poverty, inequalities and marginalisation. Attempted transitions to sustainable 
development pathways that do not adequately address climate impacts, the costs and 
possible negative effects of mitigation strategies, limits to adaptation, or negative synergies 
among diverse policy options, may lead to negative outcomes for poor communities. In this 
article we ask in which direction did the HDR 2011 move in relation to the schizophrenic 
stance on climate change seen in the HDR 2007/2008. We also ask to what extent the HDR 
2011 met its own demands to integrate equity in discussions about sustainability.  
 Thus this article analyses the HDR 2011 with emphasis on the treatment of climate 
change and the poor, human rights, and North-South relations. We give special attention to 
the report’s relevance to Africa, the poorest continent, and its references to South Africa, a 
country with a medium Human Development Index (HDI), a growing economy and increasing 
CO2 emissions, but high inequality and persistent poverty, in order to illustrate how issues of 
growth, inequality, climate change and poverty are intertwined and how these are handled in 
the report. We argue that while the HDR 2007/2008 had taken some important steps in 
bringing a human rights perspective into the framing of climate change and its importance for 
the poor, the HDR 2011 on environmental sustainability and equity has stepped back. It 
downgrades the urgency of climate change impacts and of countering its causes. Moreover, it 
puts forward a weakened definition of sustainable development compared to the widely used 
definition of the Brundtland Report,12 and it distances itself from human rights concerns, from 
the political barriers to sustainability, and from the structural causes of poverty and inequality 
as key determinants of social and environmental vulnerability. 
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 Part 2 looks at the HDR 2011’s Foreword. Part 3 examines the report’s Overview in 
detail, page by page. Part 4 summarises the framing provided by the report’s Overview, its 
inclusions and exclusions, and compares them with those in the Overviews of the HDR 
2007/2008 and the WDR 2010; and then analyses the lexical choices in these Overviews, as 
a further test of our interpretation of the framings. Part 5 considers the treatment of Africa – 
the continent likely to be hardest hit by climate change – and particularly of South Africa, in 
this case in the HDR 2011 as a whole, with reference again to the patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion of issues and the degree of adequacy of the analysis. Part 6 concludes. 
 In the remainder of this Introduction we outline the scope of the HDR 2011 and of our 
methods for investigation. The full report on sustainability and equity is a book-length study of 
about 125 double-columned pages; the HDR 2011 also contains almost 60 pages of tables of 
human development data. We concentrate on the report’s Overview, because it is a large self-
contained document, and is the part of the report that has by far the largest audience and is 
correspondingly prepared with special attention. Most of the HDR audience only reads the 
Overview. Given this, we will look at the self-contained version of the HDR 2011 Overview, 
which is found in the separate Summary file available on the HDR website.13 It consists of 15 
double-spaced pages (in contrast to the 12-page version in the full report). This version incor-
porates into the Overview selected tables and figures from the full report. The Summary also 
contains the Foreword, of two pages, and five pages of selected key human development ta-
bles. This is unusual – the HDR 2007/2008 Overview did not add such a mass of data – but it 
matches the line of argumentation in the HDR 2011, much of which is generalised in terms of 
countries, which are grouped into four categories: very high human development; high human 
development; medium human development; low human development. The selected tables 
rank 187 countries in these terms. It is worth adding that the HDR 2011 is a much smaller 
document than the HDR 2007/2008 on climate change: the earlier study was over 220 pages 
long, and its Overview was almost double the length of that for 2011, reflecting a more com-
plex and ambitious argumentation. 
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Table 1: Structure of HDR 2011  
The complete report 
Chapter 1. Why sustainability and equity? 
1. Are there limits to human development? 
2. Sustainability, equity and human 
development 
3. Our focus of inquiry 
 
Chapter 2. Patterns and trends in human 
development equity and environmental indicators  
1. Progress and prospects 
2. Threats to sustaining progress 
3. Success in promoting sustainable and 
equitable human development 
 
Chapter 3.Tracing the effects – understanding the 
relations 
1. A poverty lens 
2. Environmental threats to people's well-
being 
3. Disequalizing effects of extreme events 
4. Disempowerment and environmental 
degradation 
 
Chapter 4. Positive synergies – winning strategies 
for the environment, equity and human development 
1. Scaling up to address environmental 
deprivations and build resilience  
2. Averting degradation 
3. Addressing climate change – risks and 
realities 
 
Chapter 5. Rising to the policy challenges 
1. Business-as-usual is neither equitable nor 
sustainable  
2. Rethinking our development model-levers 
for change 
3. Financing investment and the reform 
agenda 
4. Innovations at the global level 
 
Tables 
 
 
 
The Summary 
Foreword by Helen Clark 
 
Overview 
Section 1. Why sustainability and equity? 
1. The case for considering sustainability and 
equity together 
2. Some key definitions 
 
Section 2. Patterns and trends, progress and 
prospects 
 
Section 3. Understanding the links 
1. Environmental threats to selected aspects of 
human development 
 Bad environments and health – 
overlapping deprivations 
 Impeding education advances for 
disadvantaged children, especially girls 
 Other repercussions 
2. Disequalizing effects of extreme weather 
events 
3. Empowerment – reproductive choice and 
political imbalances 
 Gender inequality 
 Power disparities 
 
Section 4. Positive synergies – winning strategies 
for the environment, equity and human development 
1. Access to modern energy 
2. Averting environmental degradation 
 
Section 5. Rethinking our development model – 
levers for change 
 Integrating equity concerns into green 
economy policies 
 A clean and safe environment - a right, 
not a privilege 
 Participation and accountability 
 Financing investments: where do we 
stand? 
 Closing the funding gap: currency 
transaction tax - from great idea to 
practical policy 
 Reforms for greater equity and voice 
 
Tables 
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We will present a frame-analysis of what has been included and what excluded in the HDR 
2011 Overview, and use lexical analysis (study of word choice) to examine how what is in-
cluded has been characterised and described.14 As an initial example, Table 1 presents a 
comparison of the scope of the full report and of its Overview. Naturally there is a close corre-
spondence, but missing from the Overview are sections corresponding to those in the full re-
port on ‘Are there limits to human development?’, ‘A poverty lens’, ‘Scaling up to address en-
vironmental deprivations and build resilience’, ‘Addressing climate change – risks and reali-
ties’, and ‘Business-as-usual is neither equitable nor sustainable’. In the other direction, ‘Ac-
cess to energy’ appears as a section in the Overview but not in the full report. Table 1 high-
lights the discrepant sections. The Overview is the public face of the report, the section read 
by most journalists, administrators or students. Its set of topics seems blander, more techno-
cratic, and less challenging to business-as-usual. The exclusion of the indicated sections is 
relevant, for some of them contain information that helps in nuancing and even countering 
some of the assertions made in the Overview, as we will explain later. The exclusions are also 
relevant for the way in which the challenges posed by climate change in Africa are depicted, 
favouring a focus on hoped-for win-win-win solutions rather than addressing the difficult struc-
tural causes of people’s vulnerability. 
  Beneath the level of section headings, what do the sections contain? Whereas the full 
report includes a modest but substantive section on human rights to a safe and sufficient en-
vironment, 15  using Martha Nussbaum’s language of people’s underlying ‘rights to bodily 
health and integrity and to enjoyment of the natural world’,16 the Overview races through ‘A 
clean and safe environment – a right not a privilege’ in three paragraphs. The condensation 
ratio is far greater here than, for example, for the technical economic topic of the Multidimen-
sional Poverty Index (MPI), which receives nine paragraphs in the Overview.17 The treatment 
of rights in the Overview shrinks to a mention of how legalised rights ‘can be effective’,18 with-
out attention to their grounding and justification. 
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   Overall, our article aims to throw light on: what principles guide the work on sustainabil-
ity by the official champion of the human development approach, the HDRO in the UN, and 
the degree to which human rights concerns and the interests of poor people are as yet re-
flected there; whether the incomplete steps towards incorporating such concerns that were 
taken in the HDR 2007/2008, with respect to threats arising from climate change, have been 
maintained and taken further, or lost and replaced by something else; and, if not maintained 
and extended, what are the implications of such a failure to adopt a human rights orientation 
in response to the threats brought by climate change, for the human rights of poor people 
everywhere, and not least in South Africa.19  
 
II FOREWORD TO THE HDR 2011 
 
The Foreword is signed by Helen Clark, former prime minister of New Zealand, Administrator 
of the UNDP since 2009 and the first woman to lead the organisation. It opens by pointing to 
the importance of seeking consensus at the 2012 Rio de Janeiro meeting, on ‘global actions 
to safeguard the future of the planet and the right of future generations everywhere to live 
healthy and fulfilling lives’.20 It states that ‘[T]his is the great development challenge of the 21st 
century’. The emphasis here is ‘on the planet’ and on ‘future generations’, rather than on 
current generations of people suffering the consequences of climate change and poverty. 
Intragenerational justice is considered in the course of the report, but it is not part of the ‘great 
development challenge’ posed in this introductory paragraph. 
 The Foreword presents the report’s main idea as follows: ‘sustainability is inextricably 
linked to basic questions of equity – that is, of fairness and social justice and of greater 
access to a better quality of life’. 21  And it continues by stating that sustainability ‘is 
fundamentally about how we choose to live our lives, with an awareness that everything we 
do has consequences for the 7 billion of us here today, as well as for the billions more who 
will follow’. 22  The ‘we’ here is all humanity. This initial treatment of humanity as one is 
important, though it needs to be followed by disaggregation, otherwise it can erase issues of 
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power imbalances between people in the global North, whose actions have had bigger 
consequences in the lives of everybody else in the world, and people of the global South, 
whose decisions are less influential in the lives of those in powerful positions. 
 The word ‘power’ is indeed mentioned in the fifth paragraph of the Foreword, referring 
to two levels at which power disparities shape the burdens and deprivations of poor people. 
The first level is the nation, where ‘power disparities and gender inequalities … amplify the 
effects of income disparities’; and the second level is global, where ‘governance 
arrangements often weaken the voices of developing countries and exclude marginalized 
groups’.23 Although power imbalances are identified at these two levels, only one of them is 
then mentioned in the action alternatives proposed by UNDP’s administrator in the Foreword: 
the national. The Foreword specifically suggests that: 
 
[s]uccessful approaches rely on community management, inclusive institutions that pay 
particular attention to disadvantaged groups, and cross-cutting approaches that coordinate 
budget and mechanisms across government agencies and development partners.24  
 
 The emphasis is on the national and sub-national, and the role of the global is mainly 
for financing, which has been its traditional official role. The Foreword does not follow up the 
impact of power imbalances at the global level; instead it goes further in relation to the 
national level, advocating investments in renewable energy, water and sanitation and 
reproductive health care. The Foreword closes with messages about the opportunity that Rio 
2012 represented to reach a ‘shared understanding’ of how to move forward.25 A key phrase, 
which captures the role of the global North in this ‘shared understanding’ is: ‘Hope rests on 
new climate finance’: more funds, and directing them ‘towards the critical challenges of 
unsustainability and inequity’.26 
 According to the Foreword, ‘[u]nderstanding the links between environmental 
sustainability and equity is critical if we are to expand human freedoms for current and future 
generations’.27 The emphasis is on ‘expanding’ human freedoms, not explicitly on constraining 
the excessive freedoms of some groups that bring damage to fundamental freedoms of others. 
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The liberal conception that development is about how individuals ‘choose to live [their] lives’, 
which we cited earlier, can sometimes be in tension with sustainability and equity and with 
seeking common and public goods. In general terms, equity and sustainability require, on the 
one hand, actions to expand some people's freedoms from fear and from want (meaning non-
fulfilment of basic needs), and on the other hand actions to restrict people's freedoms to 
accumulate at the expense of damaging others and the environment. We will see that the 
emphasis of the report is on the first set of actions, focusing on the poor and disadvantaged in 
the world, and not on the actions of the rich and on the need to design also some restrictions 
to cope in particular with the emissions problem. The Overview declares that ‘people’s 
chances at better lives should not be constrained by factors outside their control’, 28  a 
sentiment that is intended to apply to the poor; but that is in danger of being converted into a 
slogan that provides protection for the rich against taxation and against regulation to control 
their actions that harm others. 
 Sometimes a report’s Foreword pulls in a different direction to the report itself, when an 
organisational apex dissociates itself from the ideas of a subsidiary. Some such tensions 
existed between the human rights perspective in the HDR 2007/2008 and the Foreword 
written by the then UNDP Administrator, long-time World Bank official Kemal Dervis. But, 
whereas the HDR 2007/2008’s title was ‘Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a 
Divided World’, the title of the HDR 2011 and of its Overview is far blander: ‘Sustainability and 
Equity: A Better Future for All’. Reference to human solidarity in order to counter global 
divisions, and to the language of human rights, which was often used in the HDR 2007/2008, 
are very largely replaced by the vaguer language of ‘equity’, as used by the WDR 2010.29 
Similarly, whereas the cover of the HDR 2007/2008 portrayed an image of the world in red, 
with a silhouette of a person looking at the world, the HDR 2011 cover has a geometrical 
figure: a square that balances on one vertex. It has no personal element and appeals not to 
compassion and responsibility but to a purely abstract notion of equity. The cover matches an 
equally abstract diagram used in the report to analyse possible trade-offs between equity and 
sustainability. 
 From reading the Foreword we have identified some of the issues whose treatment in 
the HDR 2011’s Overview deserve examination: the degree of attention to regulating 
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excessive and damaging freedoms, in addition to promoting expansion of freedoms; the 
degree of attention to the activities and responsibilities of rich persons, not only poor persons; 
and the degree of attention to the development, activities and responsibilities of rich countries, 
not only poor countries. 
 
III MAIN THEMES IN THE HDR 2011 OVERVIEW 
 
The Overview opens by emphasising the links between sustainability, equity and human 
development, stating that environmental degradation intensifies inequality through adverse 
impacts on already disadvantaged people, and that inequalities in human development 
amplify environmental degradation. The report aims to point to pathways that can achieve 
human development together with sustainability and equity.30    
  
(a) Section on ‘Why sustainability and equity?’ 
 
The opening section proposes that environmental sustainability and equity ‘are fundamentally 
similar in their concern for distributive justice’31 yet even today these topics are approached 
separately in many cases. Sustainability reflects a concern for future generations, and equity 
reflects a concern for those in current generations who are disadvantaged. Next the concept 
of human development is presented, using Sen's conceptualisation, ie expansion of the field 
of attainable valued outcomes. As noted earlier, the focus on expanding some people's 
choices leaves out of focus the question of constraining some others’ freedoms. This is of 
central importance as sustainability refers to ecological limits that logically imply limits on 
humans’ appropriate freedoms to use nature. Not surprisingly, the formulation then given by 
the report of the concept of sustainable human development – ‘the expansion of the 
substantive freedoms of people today while making reasonable efforts to avoid seriously 
compromising those of future generations’,32  represents a major weakening of the 1987 
Bruntland Commission definition. That referred to development, which ‘meets the needs of 
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the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ ;33 
it had a focus on outcomes not just efforts and left no room for equivocation about what is 
‘serious’ damage. 
 The report advocates an approach to environmental sustainability that ‘favours the 
position of preserving basic natural assets and the associated flow of ecological services’,34 
and argues that this aligns with human rights-based approaches to development. But the 
argument is a mere claim, since no specifics are given to demonstrate how this focus on 
preserving environmental assets has direct or indirect consequences for rights. At the same 
time, it makes the case for a framework that acknowledges that sustainability and equity are 
not necessarily mutually reinforcing, ‘for example if [pro-environment measures] constrain 
economic growth in developing countries’. 35  The report encourages us to give special 
attention to trade-offs between these objectives and to identifying policies that show ‘positive 
synergies’: what they call ‘win-win-win solutions that favour sustainability, equity and human 
development’.36 ‘Win-win’ is a concept for describing when more than one group gains, but 
here it is adapted to describe how more than one objective can be promoted. It is a part of 
managerial jargon widely used in dominant framings of climate and development, such as that 
presented in the WDR 2010. Moreover, there is a switch in the definition of sustainable 
development from referring to the lives of specific groups of people to referring to national 
averages and aggregates for achievement of objectives. This stands in contrast to the 
humanistic language chosen in the HDR 2007/2008, which repeatedly openly emphasised the 
lives and livelihoods of recognisable groups of persons, including in its Overview: ‘rural 
communities in Bangladesh, farmers in Ethiopia and slum dwellers in Haiti’.37 Such language 
has disappeared in the HDR 2011 Overview. 
 
(b) Section on ‘Patterns and trends, progress and prospects’ 
 
This section in the Overview argues that: the links between the HDI (particularly its income 
component) and environmental degradation are not linear; the poor are affected 
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disproportionately by climate change; but win-win-win solutions can be enacted, so growth 
does not have to be unequal and unsustainable. 
  It first examines a range of predictions related to environmental degradation and 
considers the implications for human development. According to two simulations prepared for 
the report of the consequences if climate change is not properly addressed, the global HDI in 
2050 will be eight or 15 per cent lower than in a baseline scenario which avoids those 
consequences, due to negative impacts on agricultural production, access to clean water and 
improved sanitation, etc. ‘These projections suggest that in many cases the most 
disadvantaged people bear and will continue to bear the repercussions of environmental 
deterioration, even if they contribute little to the problem.’38 The scale and significance of 
these repercussions is in fact seriously concealed by an aggregated index like the HDI, which 
sums up achievements for all inhabitants of a country or region. Such an index is misleading 
and inadequate for conveying the scale of impacts on poor people, many of whom may fare 
far worse than does the national or regional average. Unlike the HDR 2007/2008 which spoke 
openly of the tens and hundreds of millions of poor people who would be seriously and 
sometimes fatally hit by these ‘repercussions’, the HDR 2011 loses such information in the 
almost useless hyper-aggregated category of global HDI. The sacrifice of many people at the 
margins of global society becomes virtually invisible under the veil of the global HDI figure. 
 Moreover, there is no balanced treatment of the structural causes of current non-
climatic and non-environmental stressors that lead towards low human development levels in 
the future. This is in striking contrast with current scholarship on the human dimensions of 
climate change and on adaptation research, for example. It is widely recognised that 
structural factors and drivers of poverty are central hindrances for future resilience, limit 
adaptation options and may even lead to maladaptation.39 A discussion on specific constraints 
towards sustainability posed by existing vulnerabilities is absent in chapters of the report 
where these constraints would logically play a central role. There is one single reference to 
poverty in the Chapter 1 ‘Why Sustainability and Equity?’ and zero references to Africa, the 
poorest continent. Yet this is the chapter that discusses the limits to human development. The 
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main references to Africa and to poverty are in relation to what the report calls win-win-win 
strategies. This centres the reader’s attention on changes in the South towards sustainability 
rather than on required changes in the unsustainable rich North, and it avoids contextualising 
the limits to such a transition that are posed by low human development. 
 Another notable choice in aggregation occurs when the Overview explains that ‘three 
quarters of the growth in emissions since 1970 comes from low, medium and high HDI 
countries', adding though that ‘overall levels of greenhouse gases remain much greater in 
very high [HDI] countries’.40 It is not clear why the report puts high HDI countries in the same 
group with medium and low HDI countries; separating these countries could be more 
revealing. For example, what is the share of low HDI countries in the growth of emissions 
since 1970? Implicitly the report responds instead to a discussion agenda set by the 
remaining group, the very high HDI countries. At the same time it makes clear that 
‘[e]missions per capita are much greater in very high HDI countries than in low, medium, and 
high HDI countries combined, because of more energy-intense activities’.41 A person in a very 
high HDI country accounts for more than 30 times the carbon dioxide emissions per person in 
a very low HDI country. In addition, the Overview notes that the current economic 
relationships between countries allow the allocation of carbon-intensive production to poor 
countries while its output is exported for consumption in rich countries.42 Deepening the 
comparisons of the environmental impacts attributable to different countries in order to reflect 
this could well have been done, but was not. 
 The Overview suggests next that ‘where the link between the environment and quality 
of life is direct, as with pollution, environmental achievements are often greater in developed 
countries, [and] where the links are more diffuse, performance is much weaker’.43 It gives 
three findings that support this general view. First, household environmental deprivations 
(indoor air pollution, inadequate access to clean water and improved sanitation) decline as 
the HDI rises. However, although these household deprivations can be seen as environmental 
issues, they should not be compared with urban air pollution or greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. They are poverty issues, whereas urban air pollution and GHG emissions are 
consequences of development-as-usual models. Household environmental deprivations are 
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issues that should be addressed as poverty-related or developmental problems, while the 
main environmental issues at stake in the sustainability debates are the ones in which 
developed countries are more involved and developing countries suffer the first and more 
intense impacts of climatic change. 
 The full report’s section on ‘a poverty lens’ – which as we saw lacks a counterpart 
section in the Overview – discusses the variables used as indicators of environmental 
deprivations: water, sanitation, cooking fuel. The section admits that: 
 
 [t]he three environmental deprivations were selected as the best comparable measures across 
countries, but other environmental threats and direct impacts of climate change may be equally 
or more acute at the local or national level. Flooding may be a more pressing concern for poor 
households in Bangladesh, for example, than access to water.44  
 
 By selecting three variables that are more linked to poverty than to impacts of 
unsustainable behaviour on the poor, the focus shifts to developing countries and away from 
the sources of unsustainability. If floods, for example, were the focus we would consider more 
the causal links between GHG emissions and environmental and social disasters. The 
examples used, such as access to sanitation and modern cooking fuels, do not make those 
links visible, and hide from view the consumption and production patterns in rich countries. 
 Second, environmental risks that have community effects (like urban air pollution) 
seem to rise and then fall with development. However, one can note that the U-shape partly 
arises because some of the activities that create urban air pollution are moved from richer to 
poorer countries. Environmental risks that have global effects (notably GHG emissions) 
typically rise with the HDI. According to the report, ‘[t]he HDI itself is not the true driver of 
these transitions’, and while incomes and economic growth ‘have an important explanatory 
role for emissions … the relationship is not deterministic either’, since for example ‘large-
scale commercial use of natural resources has different impacts than subsistence 
exploitation’.45 ‘Several countries have achieved significant progress both in the HDI and in 
equity and environmental sustainability’,46 the win-win-win solution. 
 The report shows a table of good performers, which includes Costa Rica, Germany, 
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Philippines and Sweden. 47  It concludes that ‘across regions, development stages and 
structural characteristics countries can enact policies conducive to environmental 
sustainability, equity and the key facets of human development captured in the HDI’.48 The 
win-win-win solutions that these countries illustrate are in terms of three criteria: global threats, 
local impacts, and equity and human development. The global threats considered are GHG 
emissions, deforestation and water use. Sweden and Germany comply with all the criteria 
except for GHG emissions. That the report chooses Germany and Sweden as examples of 
win-win-win policies, even though neither performs adequately by the GHG emissions 
criterion,49 shows its downgrading of climate change and of the global poor. Thus not included 
in its estimation of win-win-win performance are the poorer groups in tropical and subtropical 
zones who are those most affected by climate change impacts of emissions in Germany, 
Sweden and elsewhere in the North – as was eloquently described in the HDR 2007/2008.  
 Immediately after presenting Germany and Sweden as good examples, the Overview 
exposes ‘environmental deterioration on several fronts [elsewhere], with adverse 
repercussions on human development’,50 such as land degradation due to soil erosion and 
overgrazing, unsustainable water use in agriculture, and deforestation, described as a ‘major 
challenge’, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab 
States.51 This geographical focus is defended in terms of the bigger impacts of environmental 
degradation and climate change on those areas,52 given the higher dependency of poor 
people on natural resources to make a living, the higher dependency of women on forests 
and fishery, the greater adverse consequences of environmental degradation faced by 
women in poor countries because they are disproportionately involved in subsistence farming 
and water collection, and the greater adverse impacts on indigenous people who also rely 
heavily on natural resources. The Overview notes in passing that ‘[e]vidence suggests that 
traditional practices can protect natural resources, yet such knowledge is often overlooked or 
downplayed’.53 This major issue itself then receives no further attention. Even in the full report 
there are only two brief references (in Chapter 4). Also unexplored is the evidence that high 
                                               
47
 Ibid 5. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 See Table 1 of the Summary (note 17 above) 5. 
50
 Overview (note 13 above) 5. 
51
 Ibid 5. 
52
 Ibid 6. 
53
 Ibid. 
16 
 
health achievements may be correlated with lower carbon emissions whereas high incomes 
are not.54   
 While the Overview’s global analysis allows us to see the role of high HDI countries in 
climate change (specifically their responsibility for GHG emissions), the local analysis that 
follows, and the emphasis on problems of the use of land, water and forests, allows the report 
to shift our attention to low-income regions and away from regions such as the United States 
and Europe, where the biggest problems of GHG emissions have been and continue to be. 
The report focuses on national and local levels in less developed countries, downgrading the 
other side of the coin: the need for changes in highly developed countries. 
 
(c) Section on ‘Understanding the links’ 
 
This section of the Overview considers links between environment and equity, including with 
reference to gender roles and empowerment. It starts by emphasising that most 
disadvantaged people carry a double burden of deprivation: they are more vulnerable to the 
wider effects of environmental degradation, and they also have to cope with ‘threats to their 
immediate environment posed by indoor air pollution, dirty water and unimproved 
sanitation’.55 But the report focuses more on diverse poverty issues than on the enormous 
longer-run implications of climate change. ‘Climate change’ is referred to only 23 times in the 
Summary for the HDR 2011, compared to 175 times in the Summary for the HDR 
2007/2008.56 The latter is somewhat longer (31 pages compared to 26 pages), and the former 
covers more aspects of environment; but still a major shift in focus is evident, which is seen in 
the frequency of usages of the term, 12.6 uses per 1,000 words in the HDR 2007/2008 versus 
2.8 in the HDR 2011. This trend is maintained in the full report. While climate change is used 
1,247 times in the HDR 2007/2008, it is mentioned 18 per cent as often in the HDR 2011 (229 
times). Furthermore, most of the central points of an important section of Chapter 2 that 
addresses climate change are missing in the Overview. That section makes bold statements 
regarding consumption patterns and carbon emissions, carbon-intensive production, trade 
and shifts of carbon emissions, and who the net importers are of carbon and wood. 
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 In contrast, the section in the Overview elaborates on ‘the pervasiveness of 
environmental deprivations among the multi-dimensionally poor’.57 Indeed it argues that these 
deprivations – in access to modern cooking fuel, clean water, and basic sanitation – 
‘disproportionately contribute to multidimensional poverty’.58 But what deserves to be called 
an environmental deprivation and what is simply an income poverty or economic poverty 
issue? No doubt, if these economic poverty issues are also called environmental deprivations, 
it is logical to say that the environmental deprivations contribute to poverty. But to focus on 
these ‘environmental deprivations’ at the expense of looking at impacts of climate change 
appears misguided. 
 The Overview then describes a series of familiar links, from the ‘environmental 
deprivations’ and other environmental degradation, to deterioration in poor people’s 
capabilities and lives. Less routinely, it notes that extreme weather events have disequalizing 
effects, and greater exposure to extreme weather events substantially reduces a country’s 
HDI. 
 Also novel, but problematic, is a proposition that ‘[t]ransformations in gender roles and 
empowerment have enabled some countries and groups to improve environmental 
sustainability and equity, advancing human development’.59 In particular, ‘in countries where 
effective control of reproduction is universal, women have fewer children, with attendant gains 
for maternal and child health and reduced greenhouse emissions’ [and] ‘evidence suggests 
that if all women could exercise reproductive choice, population growth would slow enough to 
bring greenhouse gas emissions below current levels’.60 Yet, as noted earlier in the Overview, 
emissions per capita are very unequal: CO2 emissions per person in a very high HDI country 
are 30 times more than for a person in a very low HDI country.61 This means that, even if it 
was true that overall emissions would decrease if women in poor countries had less children, 
the impact of such policies would be far less than from the reduction of emissions in rich 
countries. Considering this, it is perhaps bizarre to suggest population control in the global 
South in order to reduce GHG emissions. The data lead us rather towards a call for changes 
in the patterns of production and consumption in the global North. Further, the data show that 
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precisely in the global North, where more gender equality has been achieved, dramatically 
higher per capita GHG emissions are produced. 
 This has implications too for two further links proposed in the section: first, that 
women's political participation has important implications for sustainability and equity: 
 
 because women often show more concern for the environment, support proenvironmental 
policies, and vote for proenvironmental leaders, their greater involvement in politics and in 
nongovernmental organizations could result in environmental gains, with multiplier effects 
across all the Millennium Development Goals.62  
 
 Given the patterns observable in rich countries with relatively high participation by 
women but also very high GHG emissions, the proposed link seems at best a weak one. 
Similarly, the report states that: 
 
 political empowerment at the national and subnational levels has been shown to improve 
environmental sustainability [and that] while context is important, studies show that 
democracies are often typically more accountable to voters and more likely to support civil 
liberties.63  
 
Yet many countries with stronger democracies are those with stronger CO2 footprints, which 
refutes any simple relationship between democracy, sustainability and equity. The section 
itself adds that even within democratic countries the needs and views of the most affected 
groups are often not reflected in policy priorities, and that the most important issue to solve is 
power imbalances. 
 Regarding what the section does not cover, issues about imbalances between 
countries in terms of power to set the agenda on climate change are not mentioned. The 
Foreword’s warning that power disparities at the global level ‘weaken the voices of developing 
countries and exclude marginalized groups’,64 is not followed up. 
 
(d) Section on ‘Positive synergies – winning strategies for the environment, equity and 
human development’ 
 
This section of the Overview discusses the win-win-win strategies that are to be created by 
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governments, civil society, private sector actors and development partners. Although effective 
solutions should be context specific, there are some principles that could work across 
countries, according to the Overview. At the local level, it stresses the need for inclusive 
institutions, and at the national level it aims for scaling-up of successful innovations and policy 
reform. The international/global level remains absent. The emphasis is on what has to be 
done at local and national levels, and specifically in developing countries. In the full report too, 
while some additional references are made in relation to power imbalances in decision-
making processes at the global level, when it comes to the solutions these imbalances are 
only addressed by reference to new financing mechanisms. 
 One specific example of proposed win-win-win strategies concerns ‘Access to modern 
energy’. The subsection starts by asking: ‘Is there a trade-off between expanding energy 
provision and carbon emissions?’, and the response is ‘not necessarily’, since ‘[t]here are 
many promising prospects for expanding energy without a heavy environmental toll’.65 For 
example, off-grid decentralised options are, according to the report, ‘technically feasible for 
delivering energy services to poor households and can be financed and delivered with 
minimal impact on the climate’.66 ‘Providing basic modern energy services provision for all 
would increase carbon dioxide emissions by only an estimated 0.8 percent’.67 The challenge 
is to expand access to global energy supply with renewables at a scale and speed that will 
improve poor people's lives. But while the report addresses the problem of avoiding increased 
impact on the climate, it does not address the problem of how to decrease that impact from 
current unsustainable levels. Neither does it address questions of unequal access to existing 
energy sources, as we shall see in its discussion of South Africa. 
 In a section titled ‘Scaling up to address environmental deprivations and build 
resilience’ (which has no counterpart in the Overview), the full report takes a conservative 
position in relation to cuts of emissions, stating that ‘[p]olicies to cut emissions nationally 
entail both potential advantages and concerns about equity and capacity’.68 Table 4.1 lists 
policy instruments to cut carbon dioxide emissions: cap-and-trade permits, emissions targets, 
taxes or charges, subsidies for renewables, subsidy cuts, performance standards, technology 
standards, and better information. The only ones with positive comments on ‘equity aspects’ 
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are: subsidy cuts and better information. However, the report does not say where these cuts 
are going to happen, whether in developing or developed countries, nor is there any treatment 
of intra-country emissions inequalities across diverse social groups and sectors. The report's 
focus on action in developing countries, where cutting of emissions may sometimes have an 
inverse relationship with equity (due to the relation that the report has showed between 
development and access to water, sanitation and energy), leads to claims which are then 
excessively generalised, and implicitly used to reduce the pressure for adjustments in 
advanced economies, who are anyway not openly discussed. 
 More broadly, the proposed win-win-win measures for averting environmental 
degradation include expanding reproductive choice, promoting community forest 
management, and adaptive disaster response, among others. Reproductive choice is 
presented as a precondition of women's empowerment, and, for reasons touched on earlier, 
as favourable for averting environmental degradation. Community forest management could, 
proposes the report, redress local environmental degradation and mitigate carbon emissions, 
though one must beware exclusionary processes inside communities through which 
disadvantaged groups may be marginalised. The third measure mentioned is the 
development of equitable and adaptive disaster responses and innovative social protection 
schemes. 
 The options mentioned in the report are important, but remain diffuse and indirect. 
They do not directly address issues of climate change. Moreover they do not provide long-
term vision and fail to take into account the possibility of a high-end increase in average 
temperatures, which will make most of the win-win-win proposals in this section unfeasible. In 
addition, these are again measures applied at the very local levels in developing countries, 
excluding the global level, as if measures in developed countries had no impact on the 
environment, although the data given earlier has made clear that such measures would have 
a stronger impact in comparison with measures in developing countries. Thinking about 
measures in developing countries is essential, but leaving invisible the responsibilities of 
developed countries on these issues is unjustifiable. 
 
(e) Section on ‘Rethinking our development model – levers for change’ 
 
This section in the Overview presents a ‘new vision for promoting human development 
21 
 
through the joint lens of sustainability and equity’.69 For the local and national levels, the 
report stresses ‘the need to bring equity to the forefront of policy and programme design and 
to exploit the potential multiplier effects of greater empowerment in legal and political 
arenas’.70 For the global level, the report highlights ‘the need to devote more resources to 
pressing environmental threats and to boost the equity and representation of disadvantaged 
countries and groups in accessing finance’.71 
 Although this section declares it is about rethinking our development model, these 
proposals are from a very longstanding development agenda. The global and international 
levels are again presented only as spaces for mobilisation of finances and not as spaces 
where rethought structures and systems can be designed and implemented. This section (as 
well as the corresponding full chapter in the report) presents the biggest challenges for a 
sustainable future as concerning changes in the global South, not changes in models of 
development in the North. 
 More specifically, the report presents the following ideas: 72  (1) Integrating equity 
concerns into green economy policies: with reference not only to people's incomes but to non-
income dimensions of well-being, indirect effects of policy, compensation mechanisms for 
adversely affected people, and the risks of extreme weather events; (2) Embedding 
environmental rights in national constitutions and legislation, as well as empowering 
institutions to work with these rights; (3) Participation and accountability: ‘greater 
empowerment can bring about positive environmental outcomes equitably’, 73  by making 
national institutions accountable; for example, it stresses the need to ‘strengthen the 
possibilities for some traditionally excluded groups, such as indigenous peoples [and women], 
to play a more active role’.74 
 These ideas bring together what has been already presented in the Overview, rather 
than transcend it as the section’s title could have implied. The attractions and limitations 
remain the same. First, the links drawn with the environment and especially with climate 
change are vague. Second, the report takes for granted the concept of green economies as a 
positive one without distributional consequences (in contrast, see the United Nations 
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Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) study on the social dimensions of the 
green economy).75 Third, these measures focus on local and national levels in developing 
countries, and do not address the main problems around climate change, which is probably 
the main threat to sustainability. An exception to this limitation is found in the following 
subsection, which proposes a currency transactions tax. 
 
(i) Subsection on ‘Closing the funding gap’ 
This subsection argues that the investments needed are large but not disproportionate in 
relation to current spending on other sectors, let alone on the military and least of all in 
comparison with speculative money flows. In order to reduce the funding gap, a currency 
transaction tax is suggested. According to the report, ‘at a very minimal rate (0.005 percent), 
and without any additional administrative cost, the currency transaction tax could yield 
additional annual revenues of about $40 billion’.76 An additional mechanism suggested is the 
monetization of part of the IMF surplus Special Drawing Rights. 
 In this one area the report makes a proposal, the currency transaction tax, that 
matches the global scale and character of the environmental dangers highlighted by repeated 
international studies like the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), the UNEP Global 
Environmental Outlook studies (2007, 2011) and the reports of the IPCC (2007).77 In other 
areas it remains significantly limited in its policy agenda. For example, when it argues ‘for 
large transfers of resources to poor countries, both to achieve more equitable access to water 
and energy and to pay for adapting to climate change and mitigating its effects’,78 the term 
‘mitigation’ has, without comment, evolved from its normal use in climate discussions, namely 
the reduction of emissions of GHGs, to instead refer to mitigation of the effects of the 
resultant climate change. Remarkably, the Overview addresses only the effects of climate 
change, not the causes, ie matters that especially concern the behaviour and responsibilities 
of governments in wealthy countries and of affluent consumers and corporations in all 
countries. 
 The Overview uses the terms ‘mitigate’, ‘mitigation’ or ‘mitigating’ only five times, and 
                                               
75
 UNRISD ‘Social Dimensions of Green Economy and Sustainable Development’ (2012). 
76
 Overview (note 13 above) 13. 
77
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) <http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/index.aspx>; UNEP Global 
Environmental Outlook studies (2007, 2011) <http://www.unep.org/geo/>; and the reports of the IPCC (2007) 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1>. 
78
 Overview (note 13 above) 13. 
23 
 
never specifically to refer to reduction of GHG emissions in rich countries or by rich producers 
and consumers. Indeed only one of the five uses even permits such reference; the others are 
about developing countries or ‘mitigation of effects’. These terms are used 27 times in total in 
the full report, plus 10 times in References and Notes. From the 27 uses, 10 are clearly 
related to mitigation of the effects of climate change, or are used ambiguously, and 11 more 
are linked to financing mitigation or mitigation costs. Four cases refer to mitigation of carbon 
emissions, but it is not clear in which countries, and two uses are not related to climate 
change at all. Considering that the report mostly focuses on developing countries, it can be 
inferred that usage of the term is largely linked to mitigation of effects of climate change or 
mitigation of carbon emissions taking place in developing countries. 
 
(ii) Subsection on ‘Reforms for greater equity and voice’ 
The last subsection of the Overview discusses reforms for greater equity and voice. It 
remarks that accountability is not sufficient but is a necessary condition for ‘building a socially 
and environmentally effective global governance system that delivers for people’. 79 Since 
accountability is not sufficient, it would have been important to mention other conditions 
needed to reduce power imbalances and promote effective global governance. However, as 
when the Overview calls for ‘[s]upport for institution building … so that developing countries 
can establish appropriate policies and incentives’,80 the emphasis is on the mechanisms in 
developing countries, and less on international institutions and the power imbalances at that 
level. This holds also for the version in the full report. 
 The Overview then calls for ‘measures to improve equity and voice in access to 
financial flows directed at supporting efforts to combat environmental degradation’. 81 The 
measures are related only to the access to financial flows, and omit other relevant global 
political and legal instruments and norms; and the talk is of environmental degradation, rather 
than specifically of climate change. The proposals in the report do not strongly address 
climate change and its causes, and only seek to ‘mitigate’ some of its effects. The fashionable 
term ‘voice’ helps to hide such silences. 
 In conclusion, the Overview proposes four country-level sets of tools to take its agenda 
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forward: low-emission, climate-resilient strategies; public-private partnerships; climate deal-
flow facilities; and coordinated implementation and monitoring, reporting and verification 
systems.82 The final proposal is for a ‘high-profile, global Universal Energy Access initiative 
dedicated to develop clean energy at the country level’.83 
 In effect, the report makes a case for not using the climate change issue to stop 
development advances in the underdeveloped world. It argues that: development is needed in 
poor countries; it can be achieved in a sustainable way; equity is both a means and a goal of 
development; and equity can lead to sustainability (this link is relatively weakly argued). Thus 
it argues that development, which is necessary for social justice, can be done without big 
impacts on the environment. However, it falls short in regard to the need to address more 
direct measures to reduce climate change, in and by the global North, or to question what 
type of development is good for the South in the medium and long term. 
 
IV FRAMING AND LEXICAL CHOICE 
 
The central question this article asks is in which direction does the HDR 2011 moves in 
relation to the schizophrenic stance in the HDR 2007/2008 on climate change. We have 
established the basis for an answer by examining in detail the arguments presented in its 
Overview. We now synthesise that analysis by a review of the inclusions and exclusions that 
we have seen in the HDR 2011; and then complement this by a comparison of its chosen 
vocabulary with the vocabularies of the HDR 2007/2008 and, by contrast, the WDR 2010 on 
climate change and development, to see the direction of movement. 
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Table 2: Spotlights and shadows - inclusions and exclusions in the HDR 2011  
 
THEME INCLUSIONS AND/OR HIGHLIGHTING EXCLUSIONS AND/OR DOWNGRADING 
Title The vague language of ‘equity’ The language of human rights 
Title Gains for everybody Our divided world; countering global divisions 
 
Geographic focus 
LDCs as a focus for analysis and policy 
advice 
DCs, global relations 
North as a source of finance (Foreword) North is not otherwise a target for policy advice 
(p.iii) 
National and local levels in less developed 
countries, via focus on problems of the use of 
land, water and forests (p.6)  
The need for changes in highly developed 
countries, via focus on greenhouse gas emissions. 
Topic focus Diverse environmental and poverty issues Causes and implications of climate change 
Topic focus:  
Power imbalances 
Power imbalances at national level, as a policy 
focus (Foreword) 
Power imbalances at global level, as a policy focus 
Analysis: global 
responsibilities for 
environmental impact 
Carbon emissions per country P.3: the re-allocation of carbon-intensive 
production to poor countries, while the output is 
exported to rich countries (p.3). 
Analytical focus ‘Win-win-win’ in terms of generalized 
objectives 
Describing the lives and livelihoods of specific 
groups of people (as done more in HDR 2007/8) 
 
Evaluative criteria 
HDI (even global HDI); national (and even 
global) averages and aggregates 
Human rights, including of the worst-off groups 
Germany and Sweden as examples of win-
win-win policies 
Germany and Sweden’s questionable perform-
ance on greenhouse gas emissions; impacts on 
poorer groups in tropical and subtropical zones (as 
described in the HDR 2007/8) 
“the planet” and “future generations” (p.ii) Current generations of people suffering the 
consequences of climate change and poverty 
Grouping of countries Very high HDI countries versus low, medium 
and high HDI countries (p.3) 
Low HDI countries are not considered separately; 
instead very high HDI countries are separated out  
 
Policy focus 
Case for not using the climate change issue to 
stop development advances in the 
underdeveloped world.  
Reducing climate change, especially through 
measures in the global north. 
Institution building in developing countries 
(p.15) 
International institutions and the power 
imbalances at that level. Institutional reform in 
rich countries 
‘Rethinking our development model’: the 
global and international levels as spaces for 
mobilization of finances  
Global and international levels as spaces where 
rethought structures and systems can be designed 
and implemented. 
Expanding freedoms for the weak Restricting those freedoms for the well-to-do 
which damage the weak  
‘Mitigating the effects’ of climate change, in 
other words ‘adaptation’ 
Mitigation: greenhouse gas emission reduction. 
The limits and barriers to adaptation. 
Population limitation in the global South (p.9) Consumption limitation in the global North 
Transformation in gender roles in the global 
South (p.9) 
High greenhouse gas emissions etc. in those 
countries where more gender equality has been 
achieved 
Democratization in the global South (p.10) Much greater environmental footprints in many 
countries with strong democracies, implying there 
are numerous other relevant conditions 
Empowerment of weaker groups in poor 
countries (p.10) 
Power imbalances between countries 
Finances for adaptation or mitigation of 
effects in developing countries 
Maladaptation, the limits to adaptation. barriers to 
adaptation, contrasting with the HDR 2007/8 
which coined the term adaptation apartheid 
LDCs Rich countries and rich persons 
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 Table 2 brings together points from the previous two parts on the contents of the re-
port’s Foreword and Overview. Inside the frame of the HDR 2011 are least developed coun-
tries (LDCs) and a certain range of permitted issues, such as local participation, local ac-
countability and gender equality, and wholly or largely outside the frame are rich countries, 
their production and consumption patterns, global relations, global participation and account-
ability, and the limits to feasible adaptation in poor countries, relations between adaptive ca-
pacity and governance, impacts of mitigation strategies, as well as maladaptation. In sum, the 
HDR 2011 is in general less questioning of the global status quo, in comparison with the HDR 
2007/2008. These exclusions and inclusions become visible through repeated close reading 
that is guided by a checklist of concerns from critical development studies, political ecology 
and literature from the field of the human dimensions of global environmental change.84   
 
(a) Lexical analysis85 
 
While parts 2 and 3 conducted the content analysis on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, and 
Table 2 reviews the findings systematically, to put figures on some of the tendencies can help 
to increase confidence in our assessment. We will do this by looking at the choices and 
frequency of use of keywords. We compare the vocabulary of the HDR 2011 to that of its 
2007/2008 predecessor and their WDR 2010 competitor. In each case we confine this 
analysis to the report Overview. 
 We remarked earlier that ‘climate change’ is referred to only 22 times in the Overview 
for the HDR 2011, compared to 157 times in the Overview for the HDR 2007/2008. While 
allowing for the greater length of the 2007/2008 report and for the 2011 report’s coverage of 
all aspects of environmental sustainability, this marks a significant reduction of priority to 
climate change in the later report. Undertaking a similar analysis for other keywords, we find 
that in the new report the rich or developed countries are little mentioned, and that many of 
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the distinctive features of the 2007/2008 report have disappeared, the features that marked it 
out as displaying a partly different field of attention and set of values than in the World Bank’s 
comparable WDR 2010. The emphasis on children, grandchildren and future generations is 
gone, the poor and the world’s poor are mentioned four times only, in comparison with 38 
times in the HDR 2007/2008, humanity is not mentioned, and other terms such as ‘social 
justice’, ‘human rights’, and ‘political’ have almost disappeared. The words ‘adaptation’, 
‘adaptive’, and ‘adapt’, are used only six times, plus once in the Foreword (versus 68 times in 
the HDR 2011), and ‘mitigation’ appears only four times and is used in a very ambiguous way, 
not referring to reduction or cutting of emissions directly. On the other hand, the terms ‘equity’ 
and ‘sustain’ (in all its variants) are widely used. These terms were characteristic of the 2010 
WDR too: ‘equity’ serves as a vaguer substitute for social justice and human rights, and 
‘sustain’ as part of a growth orientation.86 
 Table 3 provides a comparison of this use of key terms in the overviews of the three 
reports. A number of complications are faced in making the comparisons. First, the reports 
vary in length. In the case of the texts of the WDR 2010 Overview and the HDR 2007/2008 
Overview there is little difference (with reference to the full version for the HDR Overview and 
after omitting References in the WDR case since the HDR Overview does not include 
references), but this is not the case with the HDR 2011. Table 3 therefore presents relative 
word frequencies rather than absolute word counts. Absolute counts are given in an appendix. 
They are in themselves significant, since not only the relative frequency of reference to a 
theme but also the absolute number of words devoted to that theme is an indicator of the 
importance given to it. 
 Second, the structures of the documents are not identical. The WDR presents a single 
version of the Overview, while the HDR presents two, one of which is at the start of the full 
version of the report, and the other of which is presented within the Summary, which is also 
available as a separate file on the HDR website. As mentioned earlier, this version of the 
Overview provides a self-contained account that also includes some additional materials from 
elsewhere in the report, notably selected tables, diagrams and sometimes text boxes. The 
WDR Overview already incorporates such materials. Further, the WDR Overview incorporates 
a Reference list, unlike the HDR Overview; while in the other direction, the HDR Summary 
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also incorporates the more substantial HDR Foreword and the Table of Contents, as part of 
the overall message that it wishes to provide in the version that it expects will be the sole 
encounter with the report for the majority of readers. Table 3 presents the simplest 
comparison: excluding in each case the Table of Contents, References, Figures and Tables, 
and separating out the Forewords. Other comparisons can be added, but inclusion of the 
additional material will not change the very sharp contrasts in vocabulary that the table 
reveals. 
 In most key respects the HDR 2011 lies clearly closer to the language of the WDR 
2010 than to the language of the HDR 2007/2008. Not only does it downgrade attention to 
future generations, the poor, human rights, and the responsibilities of rich countries, it even 
drops the concept of ‘humanity’ which was prominent in the 2007/2008 report and which one 
would expect to find as part of the perspective that distinctively legitimates preparing a HDR 
in contrast to the more conventional economic analysis in the WDR. In a few cases, the 
language is unchanged from 2007/2008: the HDR 2011 does not adopt the WDR 2010’s 
heavy use of ‘efficient’, ‘management’ and ‘can’, or its interest in the economic logic of 
insurance. It is less averse to the term ‘political’ than is the WDR, and retains a UN style of 
speaking in terms of ‘we’ (35 uses, compared to 56 in the HDR 2007/2008 Overview and only 
11 in the WDR 2010 Overview) and of appealing for action in the face of global ‘challenges’. 
But it no longer presents these challenges as exceptionally urgent: use of the idea of 
‘catastrophe’ declines, and the term ‘threshold’ almost disappears, in both cases down to the 
same frequency as in the WDR 2010 Overview. 
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Table 3: The languages of the three Report Overviews 
 
TERM/PHRASE 
Frequency of usage
87 
 
 
HDR 2007/8 OVERVIEW  
[Excluding foreword, table 
of contents, notes and 
references] 
HDR 2011 
OVERVIEW 
[Excluding foreword, table 
of contents, notes and 
references] 
WDR 2010 OVERVIEW 
[Excluding table of contents, 
notes and references] 
We 0.46 [0.60] 0.48 [0.48] 0.07 
Children / our children 0.09 [0.10] 0.11 [0.10] 0.01 
grandchildren 0.02 [0.03] 0.01 [0.01] 0.00 
future generations 0.16 [0.14] 0.04 [0.06] 0.00 
the world’s poor and 
future generations 
0.05 [0.04] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 
the world’s poor / the 
world's poorest 
0.21 [0.19] 0.00 [0.01] 0.00 
the poor / the poorest / 
the world poorest[as a 
noun;  in addition to 
uses of ‘the world’s 
poor’] 
0.11 [0.12] 0.06 [0.05] 0.05 
the world 0.24 [0.27] 0.14 [0.17] 0.10 
Humanity 0.07 [0.06] 0.00 [0.00] 0.01 
human rights 0.08 [0.07] 0.03 [0.02] 0.00 
community/communit
ies 
0.10 [0.11] 0.17 [0.19] 0.05 
the international 
community 
0.02 [0.03] 0.03 [0.04] 0.00 
global community 0.01 [0.01] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 
human community 0.02 [0.01] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 
Climate change 1.29 [1.26] 0.30 [0.28] 0.48 
justice / injustice 0.07 [0.06] 0.03 [0.04] 0.00 
equity / equitable 0.02 [0.01] 0.82 [0.84] 0.10 
political/politically/po
litics 
0.17 [0.17] 0.11 [0.11] 0.04 
‘efficiency’/’efficient’
/’inefficient’/’inefficie
ncy / inefficiencies 
0.16 [0.15] 0.03 [0.02] 0.31 
‘climate smart’ 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] 0.06 
Threshold/s 0.06 [0.05] 0.01 [0.01] 0.01 
Catastrophe/s/catastro
phic 
0.09 [0.09] 0.04 [0.04] 0.05 
insurance, insurers, 
insure 
0.02 [0.04] 0.00 [0.00] 0.11 
Challenge/s / 
Challenging 
0.16 [0.19] 0.21 [0.22] 0.07 
Can 0.26 [0.25] 0.36 [0.35] 0.51 
manage/(mis)manage
ment/mismanaging 
0.06 [0.06] 0.06 [0.05] 0.28 
Rich countries / rich 
nations / rich world/ 
the rich/er 
0.21 [0.20]  0.03 [0.02] 0.01 
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Developed country/ies 
/ world 
0.14 [0.12] 0.01 [0.01] 0.03 
Mitigation/mitigating 0.30 [0.29] 0.06 [0.06] 0.57 
economic growth [or 
growth meaning 
economic growth] 
0.11 [0.09] 0.07 [0.07] 0.16 
effective/effectiveness 0.02 [0.01] 0.12 [0.11] 0.13 
consumption 0.05 [0.04] 0.04 [0.05] 0.13 
sustain [in all variants] 0.26 [0.22] 0.57 [0.62] 0.07 
tipping points 0.02 [0.01] 0.03 [0.02] 0.01 
fight / fighting 0.05 [0.04] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 
financ/e/es/ing/ed/ial 0.26 [0.23] 0.30 [0.32] 0.55 
investment/s/ 
investor/s 
0.20 [0.21] 0.14 [0.15] 0.19 
adapt/adaptation/adapt
ive 
0.56 [0.52] 0.08 [0.09] 0.35 
Reduce - cut(ing) 
/emissions – 
greenhouse 
0.21 [0.19] 0.01 [0.01] 0.12 
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V IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORT’S FRAMING FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Downgrading attention to future generations, the poor, human rights, and the responsibilities 
of rich countries, along with a focus on technocratic proposed win-win-win synergies between 
environment and (an instrumental view of) equity and human development, will have serious 
consequences for sub-Saharan Africa, including for South Africa and especially the poorest 
groups. We suggest that the report’s re-framing of sustainability and its weak treatment of the 
absolute importance of climate change impacts in the region leads to an insufficient and 
sometimes misleading picture of the problems faced by the most vulnerable groups. The 
substantial changes in language, in the framing of the problems and in the solutions offered in 
the HDR 2011, compared to the HDR 2007/2008, blind the reader to existing systemic socio-
economic failures and to constraints on an appropriate balance between economic and 
environmental issues. In this part we unpack the treatment the report as a whole gives to 
South Africa and pay particular attention to the implications for South Africa’s poor. 
 First, the Overview – the report’s key chapter, that reflects the priority concerns of its 
controllers – only mentions African countries when identifying the likely reduction in human 
development that environmental degradation and increased climate change impacts will bring 
to the region.88 Desertification and deforestation are highlighted as particular worries.89 But 
beyond some thin references to the importance of gender equity for sub-Saharan Africa, little 
else is said about what the HDR 2011 perspective offers to Africa’s poor.  
 The report fails to address properly the fact that for African countries sustainability 
cannot be disassociated from the pressure that climate change impacts pose. Multiple 
stressors make climate a development challenge that calls for addressing underlying causes 
of vulnerability rather than glossing over them. In particular, the report downplays socio-
economic, political and institutional factors that limit adaptive capacity and pose barriers to 
adaptation and resilience. Socio-economic, cultural and political vulnerabilities are recognised 
in climate change research as factors likely to lead to maladaptation, new vulnerabilities and 
increased inequalities for Africa’s poorest sectors.90 Moreover, climate impacts in the African 
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continent, if average global temperatures rise close to or above two degrees, are likely to be 
much stronger, and frequently devastating. For example the likelihood of drying for southern 
Africa increases dramatically as average temperatures rise more than 2oC.91 Agricultural and 
food production may be seriously compromised leading to deep food insecurity. Changes in 
disease vectors, increased cases of malnourishment, and diseases related to extreme events 
will increase pressures in already weak health systems. 92 The likelihood of conflicts and 
ethnic tensions due to declining access to resources is likely to increase, jeopardising the 
prospect of achieving sustainable and peaceful futures. 93  Forced migration due to 
environmental pressures and changes in livelihoods patterns are also well known 
consequences of climate impacts, a theme that was well explored in the 2007/2008 report.94 
Also absent in the 2011 report are the problems in the increasingly overcrowded cities of the 
developing world. And last, the report fails to consider high-end temperature scenarios. 
Authoritative research shows the impacts of three or four degrees average temperature 
increase and associated changes in precipitation patterns in the African continent as being 
dramatic for its socio-economic systems.95 The report’s talk of win-win-win strategies leads to 
complacency rather than preparedness. 
 The treatment of less developed countries is in general skewed towards an excessively 
optimistic picture that hides serious risks and reasons for concern that were documented in 
detail in the Fourth IPCC Report.96 With the exception of a single reference to the negative 
effects of extreme events,97 the HDR 2011 also fails to take into account the impacts of 
extreme events in the region. These are well documented in the IPCC Special Report on 
Extreme Events (SREX), whose summary for policy-makers was released prior to the HDR, 
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and in the report on disaster risk also published early in 2011.98 Thus the overall framing of 
the options for a sustainable future in Africa is neither revealing of specific negative conditions 
attached to low levels of human development, nor sufficiently cautious given the very high 
risks to food, health and water security, and disaster preparedness and reconstruction that 
are documented in the SREX, and the substantive changes in precipitation and other likely 
impacts related to high-end scenarios. 
 An analysis of references to the region in the overall report unveils an uneven 
treatment of the structural problems responsible for high inequalities and persisting poverty in 
Africa. References to South Africa appear mainly in relation to positive synergies and winning 
strategies for the environment, equity and human development. There are zero references to 
the continent in the chapter that discusses the limits to human development, although much 
climate change scholarship has shown how poverty conditions and low levels of human 
development are central factors for vulnerability to environmental change and of paramount 
importance in limiting adaptation options. While references to South Africa’s particular 
challenges for the poor are absent in the chapters dedicated to poverty or the limits to human 
development (Chapters 1 and 3), South Africa figures in chapters dedicated to success 
stories and focused on positive synergies (as in Chapters 4 and 5). 
 Most references to South Africa present an unrealistic picture that hides structural 
conditions and inequalities that act as barriers and limits to resilience and sustainability. The 
report talks about expanding access to energy through massive investments in coal-fired 
plants, such as the World Bank’s US$3,75-billion loan to build South Africa’s Medupi coal 
plant, and mentions the ‘concerns about greenhouse gas emissions and environmental 
degradation as well as carbon lock-in when the longevity of infrastructure prolongs the use of 
obsolete technologies’.99 But it also presumes such investments will lead to access to energy 
for poor people, assuming that lack of access to energy in South Africa is only related to 
availability and not to distributional biases. As Patrick Bond details, there has already been a 
sharp increase in electricity prices to pay for the building of this plant, in a country where the 
vast majority of poor people can hardly pay existing prices.100 Eskom, South Africa’s main 
electricity company, subsidises huge amounts of energy supply to mining corporations, who 
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pay the lowest energy prices in the world. Expansion along existing lines does not increase 
jobs, gives no special treatment or effort to assure access to energy for the poor, and the 
environmental pollution associated with the building and functioning of these coal-fired plants 
systematically harms poor people. 101 
 The report advocates a: 
 
high-profile, global Universal Energy Access Initiative with advocacy and awareness and 
dedicated support to developing clean energy at the country level. Such an initiative could kick 
start efforts to shift from incremental to transformative change.102  
 
These claims are decontextualized from existing conditions that prevent access to energy and 
other basic needs and that act as barriers. The use of the term transformative is thus 
misplaced, since in the literature it refers to drastic changes to the conditions that produce 
and perpetuate exclusion.103 
 Similarly, the report presents South Africa as a successful example in integrating the 
goals of social protection, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in 
relationship to water management. South Africa’s Working for Water Programme, the report 
argues, includes ‘an environmental component, increased stream flows and water availability, 
improved land productivity and biodiversity in some ecologically sensitive areas’.104 Even if 
this programme is an excellent example of conservation that at the same time provides jobs 
for poorer groups, the absence of a discussion of the deep-rooted problems of lack of access 
to water and the environmental injustices that plague millions of poor South Africans leads to 
an unrealistic picture of the feasibility of a sustainable future.105 
 The HDR 2011’s focus on win-win-win strategies fails to acknowledge existing 
inequalities in access to energy and other basic needs, and the forces that generate and 
perpetuate them, while it highlights the very small advances through fiscal reforms that tax 
some environmental services.106 The report further highlights South Africa’s claimed success 
in enforcing environmental rights whereas another article in this Special Issue documents 
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poor performance of the legal system in relation to the environment.107 We find a particular 
mention of how the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 guarantees the right of 
access to any information.108 But the report remains silent on the underlying processes that 
reduce freedom and capacity of individuals and groups to respond to information, including 
illness, illiteracy, innumeracy, and fear for personal safety. 
 The HDR 2011 treatment of models for rethinking development says next to nothing 
about the concerns expressed by many civil society organisations about the misuse of the 
concept ‘green economies’ in ways that undermine rather than promote sustainable 
development. Key concerns include the abuse of biofuels, land grabbing, and negative effects 
of much economic activity labelled as ‘green’, more commodification of nature, and even 
more conditionalities and new forms of protectionism.109 
 In short, the depiction of Africa, and in particular South Africa, in this report is not 
realistic and may lead to complacency and poor national policy-making that remains blind to 
structural problems and power imbalances responsible for limiting freedoms and capabilities 
of millions of poor South Africans. It is a different treatment of the problems and opportunities 
in the region than the one presented in the HDR 2007/2008, and suggests a substantive shift 
in thinking in the UNDP HDRO. 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
This article asked in which direction the thinking on environment and sustainability by UNDP’s 
HDRO has evolved since the HDR 2007/2008, which combined a radical human rights-based 
diagnosis and critique with a largely conventional economic set of policy proposals, mostly 
close to those in the WDR 2010. Frame analysis of HDR 2011 indicates its convergence 
towards a World Bank perspective: inside the frame are LDCs and a certain range of 
permitted issues, including ‘extending freedoms’, while largely outside the frame are rich 
countries, global relations, restricting some freedoms, and even, to a surprising and disturbing 
extent, climate change mitigation. Mitigation of GHG emissions substantially disappears from 
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view and is replaced by talk of ‘mitigation of effects’. At the same time, the structural 
conditions that limit adaptation to the impacts of climate change and prevent resilience, 
conditions that may lead also to maladaptation and generation of new vulnerabilities, are 
never addressed. Lexical analysis, the comparison of word choices, corroborated this picture. 
 The HDR 2011 is surprisingly muted on issues of climate change, and does not 
address key aspects including the need to radically cut GHG emissions. On the contrary, the 
report takes a conservative position on the issue of cutting emissions, focusing more on 
expanding access to energy in developing countries in a sustainable way, and neglecting 
measures to decrease the current impact of unsustainable emissions. Climate change is 
underemphasised in the report, partially displaced by the concept of environmental 
sustainability. This takes away urgency from addressing the existing development pathways in 
the advanced economies primarily responsible for emissions, and thus can be seen as a step 
backwards. Additionally, the concept of sustainable human development used in the report is 
formulated in a far weaker way in comparison to the 1987 Bruntland Commission version, by 
focusing on ‘reasonable’ efforts instead of outcomes, and by implicitly accepting infringement 
of future generations’ substantive freedoms. In the 2007/2008 report, in contrast, the case for 
radical action was forcefully made.  
 The HDR 2011’s area of main focus is the relationship between environmental 
degradation and the promotion of human development, including issues of gender and 
democratic participation. Not all the links it proposes there are strong, and some are 
problematic. Emphasis on the political dimensions of climate change and poverty is given only 
for the local and national levels, leaving invisible the issues of power at the global level. The 
change of focus in the 2011 report in comparison to the 2007/2008 report is such that the 
HDR 2011 even – astonishingly – ignores the HDR 2007/2008 when mapping earlier 
contributions in HDRs on environmental sustainability. Listed on page 14 of the full report are 
the HDR 1990, the HDR 1994 and the HDR 2010 that emphasised the links between 
sustainability and human development. Extraordinarily, unmentioned in this brief history is the 
HDR 2007/2008 devoted to climate change. 
 Overall the HDR 2011 appears a severely diluted successor to the HDR 2007/2008, 
and much closer in perspective to the World Bank. This resolution of the 2007/2008 report’s 
schizophrenia is consistent with the backgrounds of the staff who were in charge for 2011. 
The 2007/2008 report was led by the then head of the HDRO, Kevin Watkins, a political 
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economist who had worked for 20 years in research and programming in human rights-
oriented non-governmental development organisations, in particular the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations and Oxfam UK. Watkins left HDRO in 2008. While the HDRO has 
editorial independence within UNDP, the head of the office is appointed by the UNDP 
administrator, in this case Kemal Dervis, who had earlier worked for 24 years in the World 
Bank. The new head was Jeni Klugman, an Australian economist who moved to the post after 
16 years in the World Bank. She was lead author for the 2011 report. Also prominent in the 
2011 report team was the HDRO head of research, Francisco R Rodriguez, a Venezuelan 
economist on leave from Wesleyan University in the US, who took up the HDRO post in 2008 
and left for the Bank of America Merrill Lynch in 2011.110 Klugman returned to the World Bank 
in 2011. Even some sections in the World Bank now appear bolder than was the HDR 2011, 
as can be seen in one new World Bank report.111 
 The disappearance of a human rights-based approach from the HDRO work on 
sustainability is not an incidental detail in this story. A rights-based approach stresses the 
fundamental importance of basic dignity for all, as something that is not to be traded-off 
against more consumption benefits for the already affluent. This means that equity is to be 
seen as an issue with intrinsic importance, and not only instrumental. Human rights-based 
approaches insist on as far as possible specifying and institutionalising systems of obligations 
to respect and promote basic rights. And they systematically track the causal chains behind 
rights violations and failures or inabilities to act on obligations, rather than turning one’s face 
away from matters that might be embarrassing for powers-that-be. The deficiencies of the 
HDR 2011 in all these respects reflects its failure to build on the HDR 2007/2008’s rights-
based problem diagnosis and to extend it into a rights-based, or at least rights-inspired, 
approach to policy design. We concluded our analysis of the HDR 2007/2008 with the 
suggestion that perhaps a different, more widely consultative, mode of report writing could 
have led to overcoming the gap between its stated values and its policy orientation.112 The 
present analysis of the HDR 2011 may suggest that the spirit in which the HDRO was created, 
to be an independent think-tank able to boldly move forward the debates on development 
strategy and development cooperation, is now in jeopardy.   
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APPENDIX: Usage of keywords in the three Reports’ Overviews113 114 
 
TERM/PHRASE 
Absolute ocurrence 
 
HDR 2007/8 OVERVIEW  
 
HDR 2011 
OVERVIEW 
 
WDR 2010 OVERVIEW 
 
We 56 [28] 35 [4] 11 
Children / our children 11 [3] 8 [0] 2 
grandchildren 3 [1] 1 [0] 0 
future generations 19 [0] 3 [2] 0 
the world’s poor and 
future generations 
6 [0] 0 0 
the world’s poor / the 
world's poorest 
25 [1] 0 [1] 0 
the poor / the poorest / 
the world poorest[as a 
noun;  in addition to 
uses of ‘the world’s 
poor’] 
13 [4] 4 [0] 8 
the world 29 [8] 10 [4] 15 
humanity 8 [0] 0 [0] 1 
human rights 10 [0] 2 [0] 0 
community/communit
ies 
12 [3] 12 [3] 8 
the international 
community 
2 [2] 2 [1] 0 
global community 1 [0] 0 [0] 0 
human community 2  [0] 0 [0] 0 
Climate change 157 [18] 22 [1] 71 
justice / injustice 8 [0] 2 [1] 0 
equity / equitable 2 [0] 59 [9] 15 
political/politically/po
litics 
21 [2] 8 [1] 6 
‘efficiency’/’efficient’
/’inefficient’/’inefficie
ncy / inefficiencies 
20 [1] 2 [0] 46 
‘climate smart’ 0 [0] 0 [0] 9 
Threshold/s 7 [0] 1 [0] 1 
Catastrophe/s/catastro
phic 
11 [2] 3 [0] 8 
insurance, insurers, 
insure 
3 [3] 0 [0] 16 
Challenge/s / 
Challenging 
20 [6] 15 [3] 11 
Can 32 [3] 26 [2] 75 
manage/(mis)manage
ment/mismanaging 
7 [1] 4 [0] 42 
Rich countries / rich 
nations / rich world/ 
the rich/er 
25 [3] 2 [0] 1 
Developed country/ies 
/ world 
17 [0] 1 [0] 4 
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Mitigation/mitigating 37 [3] 4 [1] 84 
economic growth [or 
growth meaning 
economic growth] 
13 [0] 5 [1] 24 
effective/effectiveness 2 [0] 9 [0] 19 
consumption 6 [0] 3 [1] 19 
sustain [in all variants] 31 [0] 41 [9] 11 
tipping points 2 [0] 2 [0] 1 
fight / fighting 6 [0] 0 [0] 0 
financ/e/es/ing/ed/ial 32 [0] 22 [4] 81 
investment/s/ 
investor/s 
24 [5] 10 [2] 28 
adapt/adaptation/adapt
ive 
68 [5] 6 [1] 52 
Reduce - cut(ing) 
/emissions - 
greenhouse 
25 [2] 1 [0] 17 
 
 
